Incident Reports

Description:
A jumper with 500 total skydives made a 2-way freefly jump from a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan on a clear, 75-degree Fahrenheit day with 3- to 5-mph ground winds. The jumper’s rig was equipped with a changeable-mode AAD that allows the user to adjust the activation parameters. The jumper was flying a Performance Designs Sabre 3 135-square-foot canopy loaded at 1.1:1. The freefall and the main-canopy deployment were uneventful. Once under canopy, the jumper made a series of aggressive but controlled toggle turns that continued until his reserve canopy deployed behind him at approximately 1,000 feet above ground level. When the jumper realized that the reserve had deployed, he discontinued turning, and the canopies settled into a stable biplane configuration with the main parachute as the dominant canopy. The jumper flew a standard pattern using the main canopy’s toggles and made a stand-up landing. The investigating Safety and Training Advisor remarked that the jumper handled the challenging, low-altitude emergency well. After the jumper landed, a Federal Aviation Administration Senior Rigger inspected the gear and determined that the cutter on the jumper’s automatic activation device had fired and severed the reserve closing loop. When interviewed, the jumper remarked that he was not familiar enough with the AAD to know whether he had set it properly for his experience level and canopy-flying style and suggested that he may have inadvertently set the AAD to student mode, which fires at a higher altitude and a slower descent rate than the standard mode. The investigator also interviewed the FAA Senior Rigger who had performed the last reserve repack. The rigger reported that he had inspected the AAD cutter during the repack but had not turned it on or altered its settings.

Conclusions:
This jumper could have prevented this incident if he had read the AAD owner’s manual, understood the firing parameters of each mode and set the AAD properly. Additionally, the skydiver did not receive a gear check at any point before the jump (although donning the equipment hid the AAD screen from view, so a gear check after putting the rig on would not have caught the issue). With the diversity of disciplines today, jumper must thoroughly understand the operating parameters of their automatic activation devices. There are many types of AADs on the market, including changeable-mode AADs, which can toggle between settings for solo students, tandem skydivers, experienced jumpers and high-performance canopy pilots. There are also specific AADs for wingsuit flyers. Jumpers need to refer to their owner’s manuals and learn the speeds and altitudes at which their specific AADs will activate or even disarm. Not having a thorough understanding could cause severe complications.

Description:
On a clear, 75-degree day with 15-mph ground winds, a jumper with 85 total skydives had an uneventful freefall and then deployed his Performance Designs Sabre 2 190-square-foot canopy, which he loaded at 1.2:1. His rig was equipped with an AAD specifically designed for students (non-changeable mode). When the jumper reached the activation altitude of his student AAD, approximately 1,000 feet, jumpers under canopy above him saw him performing spiral turns. His AAD then fired, and his reserve fully deployed. He successfully cut away his main parachute, leaving him under a reserve that was fully open and stable. At approximately 50 feet, the jumper attempted to turn into the wind for landing. He hit the ground with his right toggle pulled down to hip level. Investigators reported that the impact was so hard that the jumper broke both femurs and both feet and "exploded" his lower vertebrae. Previously, the local S&TA had warned this jumper that he shouldn’t jump his current canopy using a student AAD because turning too abruptly at a low altitude would cause the AAD to activate. The jumper ordered an appropriate AAD, which arrived the morning of the incident, but he decided to keep jumping the old one until he could have the new one installed. In addition, the jumper had reportedly received repeated warnings about making low turns, including just a few days before the incident, when he made a low turn to face into the wind for landing. At that time, the S&TA reminded the jumper that a wing must have time to recover to level flight for landing after a turn and that only minor corrections to a flight path are acceptable under 300 feet. The investigator speculated that the jumper may have returned to the habit of turning low after the two-canopies-out situation overwhelmed him. Regardless, if the jumper had been using an AAD appropriate for his type of canopy flight, he would have avoided this situation and had enough time to set up for an appropriate landing.

Conclusions:
With the diversity of disciplines today, jumper must thoroughly understand the operating parameters of their automatic activation devices. There are many types of AADs on the market, including changeable-mode AADs, which can toggle between settings for solo students, tandem skydivers, experienced jumpers and high-performance canopy pilots. There are also specific AADs for wingsuit flyers. Jumpers need to refer to their owner’s manuals and learn the speeds and altitudes at which their specific AADs will activate or even disarm. Not having a thorough understanding could cause severe complications.

Description:
After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy flight, a jumper with approximately 4,500 total skydives performed a 270-degree turn for landing under a Fluid Wings Air Wolf 67-square-foot canopy loaded at 2.65:1. It was reportedly a clear, 75-degree day with no ground winds. As the jumper completed the turn at about 150 feet, the AAD activated, deploying the reserve canopy. The two canopies formed an unstable downplane, and the jumper hit the ground hard while attempting a parachute landing fall. The jumper broke one ankle and shattered the heel on the other foot. This jumper reportedly used a container equipped with a standard, non-changeable-mode AAD but swapped out the main canopies depending on what type of skydive he was making. When he was planning on making a high-performance landing, he would switch off the AAD. In a rush between loads, this jumper forgot to turn off his AAD before this jump. If the jumper had invested in an AAD designed specifically for high-speed landings (one that requires a higher speed to activate and that ceases operation below 330 feet), he could have avoided this outcome.

Conclusions:
With the diversity of disciplines today, jumper must thoroughly understand the operating parameters of their automatic activation devices. There are many types of AADs on the market, including changeable-mode AADs, which can toggle between settings for solo students, tandem skydivers, experienced jumpers and high-performance canopy pilots. There are also specific AADs for wingsuit flyers. Jumpers need to refer to their owner’s manuals and learn the speeds and altitudes at which their specific AADs will activate or even disarm. Not having a thorough understanding could cause severe complications.

Description:
A jumper with 500 total skydives made a 2-way freefly jump from a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan on a clear, 75-degree Fahrenheit day with 3- to 5-mph ground winds. The jumper’s rig was equipped with a changeable-mode AAD that allows the user to adjust the activation parameters. The jumper was flying a Performance Designs Sabre 3 135-square-foot canopy loaded at 1.1:1. The freefall and the main-canopy deployment were uneventful. Once under canopy, the jumper made a series of aggressive but controlled toggle turns that continued until his reserve canopy deployed behind him at approximately 1,000 feet above ground level. When the jumper realized that the reserve had deployed, he discontinued turning, and the canopies settled into a stable biplane configuration with the main parachute as the dominant canopy. The jumper flew a standard pattern using the main canopy’s toggles and made a stand-up landing. The investigating Safety and Training Advisor remarked that the jumper handled the challenging, low-altitude emergency well. After the jumper landed, a Federal Aviation Administration Senior Rigger inspected the gear and determined that the cutter on the jumper’s automatic activation device had fired and severed the reserve closing loop. When interviewed, the jumper remarked that he was not familiar enough with the AAD to know whether he had set it properly for his experience level and canopy-flying style and suggested that he may have inadvertently set the AAD to student mode, which fires at a higher altitude and a slower descent rate than the standard mode. The investigator also interviewed the FAA Senior Rigger who had performed the last reserve repack. The rigger reported that he had inspected the AAD cutter during the repack but had not turned it on or altered its settings.

Conclusions:
This jumper could have prevented this incident if he had read the AAD owner’s manual, understood the firing parameters of each mode and set the AAD properly. Additionally, the skydiver did not receive a gear check at any point before the jump (although donning the equipment hid the AAD screen from view, so a gear check after putting the rig on would not have caught the issue). With the diversity of disciplines today, jumper must thoroughly understand the operating parameters of their automatic activation devices. There are many types of AADs on the market, including changeable-mode AADs, which can toggle between settings for solo students, tandem skydivers, experienced jumpers and high-performance canopy pilots. There are also specific AADs for wingsuit flyers. Jumpers need to refer to their owner’s manuals and learn the speeds and altitudes at which their specific AADs will activate or even disarm. Not having a thorough understanding could cause severe complications.

Description:
This 43-year-old jumper with one year in the sport and 59 total jumps was flying a 190-square-foot Fluid Wings Nexus canopy on a chilly but clear and calm day. To work on accuracy, the jumper chose a windsock as the intended landing target. Unfortunately, the jumper was a little too accurate, and after making a turn to the final leg of the pattern, was on a direct course to hit the windsock. The jumper then initiated a last-minute turn to avoid the collision. In the confusion of the moment, the jumper forgot to flare or perform a parachute landing fall. The hard landing knocked the jumper unconscious.

Conclusions:
There are far better options than picking an obstacle for a target when practicing accuracy. With a one-pound bag of flour, a jumper can draw a circle in a landing area visible from the start the landing pattern, and it will last for weeks. A one-pound bag of time-released fertilizer applied early in the year will also green up a target area, and it can last the entire season. Jumpers can also use a soft and flexible road cone, which they can move around to simulate different scenarios. These options require a little forethought, but all jumps do. A little planning can go a long way!

Description:
This jumper, who had two years in the sport and 390 jumps, exited a Cessna 208 Super Caravan for a 2-way sit-fly jump. Approximately 1,500 feet after exit, the jumper had a premature opening while in a sit. The canopy, a 139-square-foot unreported model made by NZ Aerosports, deployed normally. The jumper sustained no injuries or equipment problems from the early deployment.

Conclusions:
Initially, investigators suspected that a loose bottom-of-container pilot-chute pouch caused the early deployment, but video revealed that the container opened prior to the pilot chute coming loose and that the jumper experienced an out-of-sequence deployment and a brief horseshoe malfunction (where the canopy is attached to the container by two points). Fortunately, the pilot chute eventually came out or the outcome could have been much worse. Investigators could not determine exactly when the pin became dislodged, but they suspect it happened during the exit. The two jumpers exited the aircraft facing one another, and this jumper may have rubbed the container against the door frame. Earlier that day, the jumper had noticed that the closing loop seemed looser than usual but did not make any further inspections or adjustments to it. Jumpers must not be lackadaisical about gear maintenance; their lives literally hang in the balance. If something does not seem right, take the time to investigate and rectify the problem before it results in an injury or worse. Premature deployments can be very serious. They quite regularly cause hard openings, which can result in damage to equipment, injury or even death. They also greatly increase the chance of entanglement. Had these jumpers had a bad exit or simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time, one or both could have become entangled in the trailing equipment. Fortunately, Lady Luck was watching over these jumpers.

Description:
This 47-year-old jumper, who in 28 months accumulated 350 total jumps (200 of which were in the previous year) was performing outside video for a tandem pair. The freefall portion of the skydive and the deployment were uneventful. The jumper then flew his 139-square-foot Precision Aerodynamics Crossfire 3, which he loaded at 1.33:1, toward the landing area. It was a clear day with light 5- to 8-knot winds on the ground. The jumper opened fairly far from the landing are and used rear-riser input to make it back. This jumper barely made it to the landing area but was flying opposite the established landing direction. At that point, the jumper initiated a 180-degree turn at a low altitude. The jumper immediately realized that the turn was too low and attempted to flare. However, it was too late for the canopy to recover, and the jumper struck the ground at a high rate of speed. The jumper sustained a broken femur, broken pelvis, lumbar-transverse-process fracture and a small facial fracture. The jumper was airlifted to the hospital and despite the serious injuries is expected to make a nearly full recovery.

Conclusions:
Although this jumper was active in the sport and had made 200 jumps in the last year, they did not have the time in the sport or the jump numbers to be able to fly a high-performance canopy, and the low-altitude emergency made this clear. The Skydiver’s Information Manual recommends that C-licensed skydivers load their canopies at 1.2:1 or less and that jumpers have a D license before using any canopy 150 square feet or smaller. Jumpers often use their recent jump numbers to justify aggressive canopy choices. How well and accurately a jumper can land their canopy in near-perfect conditions is not a good barometer of canopy skills. A far better metric is how well a jumper can handle bad landing conditions. This jumper likely fixated on landing onto the wind (not a landing priority) and experienced a self-induced low-altitude emergency by choosing to make a last-minute low turn. This jumper would have fared much better landing downwind or performing a slow, flat, 90-degree turn to land perpendicular to the wind line. Experiencing this problem on a larger, more forgiving canopy would have lowered the chance of injury and also provided the experience necessary to safely navigate the same problem after eventually downsizing. Most importantly, jumpers need to recognize early when they may not make it back to a landing area and begin planning for an alternative at an appropriate altitude.

Description:
A 34-year-old jumper with an impressive 227 total jumps in nine months in the sport flew a 190-square-foot canopy of an unknown make and model on a clear, 60-degree day. The report then stated simply, “Hard landing. Didn’t finish flare.”

Conclusions:
Although we appreciate jumpers filing incident reports at all, regrettably, this report did not offer much useful detail. Consequently, we are unable to provide much useful guidance beyond saying that when a flare or landing seems off, jumpers should perform a parachute landing fall. Therefore, we can only speculate. It is hard to believe that a jumper as current as this one would simply forget to flare. Could it be that someone or something caused a distraction? USPA’s Incident Reporting Form (available at uspa.org/ir) now includes a speculation section in addition to the description section, which is just for facts. By including speculation on why or how an incident occurred, USPA may gain an insight that cannot be derived from just the facts alone. When combined with information from other reports, even the smallest details can uncover dilemmas that reveal a larger problem.

Description:
This jumper, who had 53 jumps and 10 months in the sport, exited a Cessna 182 on a clear day with light (10-15 mph) ground winds. This jump—his second in the past 30 days—was his first flight on a 188-square-foot Aerodyne Research Pilot canopy at a wing loading of 1:1. He downsized from a 200-square-foot Performance Designs Navigator. The jumper’s exit, freefall and canopy flight were uneventful until he started his landing pattern. The winds were coming from an atypical direction for the landing area, so jumpers were flying unfamiliar patterns. This jumper was the last to land and set up for his landing high. As he approached a tree line at the far end of the landing area, he started a slow, right-hand turn at about 75 feet off the ground. During the turn, the jumper experienced turbulence, which collapsed his canopy’s left end cell. He did not flare, and when he landed, his hands were still in the toggles, but his right hand was all the way down and his left hand all the way up. The jumper made impact on the side of his body in a freshly plowed corn field. The report did not state whether he sustained injury.

Conclusions:
Although this jumper’s canopy choice was not aggressive, he did downsize immediately after a long layoff, which is not a wise decision. The report stated that this jumper did not have confidence in his canopy flight and frequently did not land on his feet. It’s likely that the jumper panicked when hit by turbulence and probably reached for the ground with his right hand, forgetting about the left hand. This arm position increased the speed of turn, which the effect of turbulence also increased. Because he was at a low altitude, this jumper should have gone into half-brakes to stop the turn and returned to level flight as soon as he felt the turbulence, then finished his flare at an appropriate altitude.

Description:
This jumper exited a Cessna 182 below a 5,000-foot ceiling. His initial freefall and canopy flight were uneventful. The jumper, flying a Performance Designs Sabre2 135-square-foot canopy at a wing loading of 1.7:1, had 800 jumps in the past five years but only three in the last 30 days. Winds were a moderate 4-8 mph on the ground. The jumper turned onto the final leg of his landing pattern around 100 feet, and the canopy did not have time to recover from the turn before the jumper reached the ground. The jumper flared a little late and tried to slide in his landing, but his foot stuck in the soft ground. The report did not state whether this jumper suffered any injuries from his poor landing.

Conclusions:
This jumper made a low turn and his skills may have been rusty after a layoff from jumping. It is much safer to make conservative choices when you haven’t been jumping as frequently. This incident is an excellent example of why it is important to start the turn to final at 300 feet, even if wind conditions are mild. The jumper tried to flare before the canopy recovered from the turn and while it was surging downward, which reduced the power of the flare.