Incident Reports

Description:
This 43-year-old jumper with one year in the sport and 59 total jumps was flying a 190-square-foot Fluid Wings Nexus canopy on a chilly but clear and calm day. To work on accuracy, the jumper chose a windsock as the intended landing target. Unfortunately, the jumper was a little too accurate, and after making a turn to the final leg of the pattern, was on a direct course to hit the windsock. The jumper then initiated a last-minute turn to avoid the collision. In the confusion of the moment, the jumper forgot to flare or perform a parachute landing fall. The hard landing knocked the jumper unconscious.

Conclusions:
There are far better options than picking an obstacle for a target when practicing accuracy. With a one-pound bag of flour, a jumper can draw a circle in a landing area visible from the start the landing pattern, and it will last for weeks. A one-pound bag of time-released fertilizer applied early in the year will also green up a target area, and it can last the entire season. Jumpers can also use a soft and flexible road cone, which they can move around to simulate different scenarios. These options require a little forethought, but all jumps do. A little planning can go a long way!

Description:
This jumper, who had two years in the sport and 390 jumps, exited a Cessna 208 Super Caravan for a 2-way sit-fly jump. Approximately 1,500 feet after exit, the jumper had a premature opening while in a sit. The canopy, a 139-square-foot unreported model made by NZ Aerosports, deployed normally. The jumper sustained no injuries or equipment problems from the early deployment.

Conclusions:
Initially, investigators suspected that a loose bottom-of-container pilot-chute pouch caused the early deployment, but video revealed that the container opened prior to the pilot chute coming loose and that the jumper experienced an out-of-sequence deployment and a brief horseshoe malfunction (where the canopy is attached to the container by two points). Fortunately, the pilot chute eventually came out or the outcome could have been much worse. Investigators could not determine exactly when the pin became dislodged, but they suspect it happened during the exit. The two jumpers exited the aircraft facing one another, and this jumper may have rubbed the container against the door frame. Earlier that day, the jumper had noticed that the closing loop seemed looser than usual but did not make any further inspections or adjustments to it. Jumpers must not be lackadaisical about gear maintenance; their lives literally hang in the balance. If something does not seem right, take the time to investigate and rectify the problem before it results in an injury or worse. Premature deployments can be very serious. They quite regularly cause hard openings, which can result in damage to equipment, injury or even death. They also greatly increase the chance of entanglement. Had these jumpers had a bad exit or simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time, one or both could have become entangled in the trailing equipment. Fortunately, Lady Luck was watching over these jumpers.

Description:
This 47-year-old jumper, who in 28 months accumulated 350 total jumps (200 of which were in the previous year) was performing outside video for a tandem pair. The freefall portion of the skydive and the deployment were uneventful. The jumper then flew his 139-square-foot Precision Aerodynamics Crossfire 3, which he loaded at 1.33:1, toward the landing area. It was a clear day with light 5- to 8-knot winds on the ground. The jumper opened fairly far from the landing are and used rear-riser input to make it back. This jumper barely made it to the landing area but was flying opposite the established landing direction. At that point, the jumper initiated a 180-degree turn at a low altitude. The jumper immediately realized that the turn was too low and attempted to flare. However, it was too late for the canopy to recover, and the jumper struck the ground at a high rate of speed. The jumper sustained a broken femur, broken pelvis, lumbar-transverse-process fracture and a small facial fracture. The jumper was airlifted to the hospital and despite the serious injuries is expected to make a nearly full recovery.

Conclusions:
Although this jumper was active in the sport and had made 200 jumps in the last year, they did not have the time in the sport or the jump numbers to be able to fly a high-performance canopy, and the low-altitude emergency made this clear. The Skydiver’s Information Manual recommends that C-licensed skydivers load their canopies at 1.2:1 or less and that jumpers have a D license before using any canopy 150 square feet or smaller. Jumpers often use their recent jump numbers to justify aggressive canopy choices. How well and accurately a jumper can land their canopy in near-perfect conditions is not a good barometer of canopy skills. A far better metric is how well a jumper can handle bad landing conditions. This jumper likely fixated on landing onto the wind (not a landing priority) and experienced a self-induced low-altitude emergency by choosing to make a last-minute low turn. This jumper would have fared much better landing downwind or performing a slow, flat, 90-degree turn to land perpendicular to the wind line. Experiencing this problem on a larger, more forgiving canopy would have lowered the chance of injury and also provided the experience necessary to safely navigate the same problem after eventually downsizing. Most importantly, jumpers need to recognize early when they may not make it back to a landing area and begin planning for an alternative at an appropriate altitude.

Description:
A 34-year-old jumper with an impressive 227 total jumps in nine months in the sport flew a 190-square-foot canopy of an unknown make and model on a clear, 60-degree day. The report then stated simply, “Hard landing. Didn’t finish flare.”

Conclusions:
Although we appreciate jumpers filing incident reports at all, regrettably, this report did not offer much useful detail. Consequently, we are unable to provide much useful guidance beyond saying that when a flare or landing seems off, jumpers should perform a parachute landing fall. Therefore, we can only speculate. It is hard to believe that a jumper as current as this one would simply forget to flare. Could it be that someone or something caused a distraction? USPA’s Incident Reporting Form (available at uspa.org/ir) now includes a speculation section in addition to the description section, which is just for facts. By including speculation on why or how an incident occurred, USPA may gain an insight that cannot be derived from just the facts alone. When combined with information from other reports, even the smallest details can uncover dilemmas that reveal a larger problem.

Description:
This jumper, who had 53 jumps and 10 months in the sport, exited a Cessna 182 on a clear day with light (10-15 mph) ground winds. This jump—his second in the past 30 days—was his first flight on a 188-square-foot Aerodyne Research Pilot canopy at a wing loading of 1:1. He downsized from a 200-square-foot Performance Designs Navigator. The jumper’s exit, freefall and canopy flight were uneventful until he started his landing pattern. The winds were coming from an atypical direction for the landing area, so jumpers were flying unfamiliar patterns. This jumper was the last to land and set up for his landing high. As he approached a tree line at the far end of the landing area, he started a slow, right-hand turn at about 75 feet off the ground. During the turn, the jumper experienced turbulence, which collapsed his canopy’s left end cell. He did not flare, and when he landed, his hands were still in the toggles, but his right hand was all the way down and his left hand all the way up. The jumper made impact on the side of his body in a freshly plowed corn field. The report did not state whether he sustained injury.

Conclusions:
Although this jumper’s canopy choice was not aggressive, he did downsize immediately after a long layoff, which is not a wise decision. The report stated that this jumper did not have confidence in his canopy flight and frequently did not land on his feet. It’s likely that the jumper panicked when hit by turbulence and probably reached for the ground with his right hand, forgetting about the left hand. This arm position increased the speed of turn, which the effect of turbulence also increased. Because he was at a low altitude, this jumper should have gone into half-brakes to stop the turn and returned to level flight as soon as he felt the turbulence, then finished his flare at an appropriate altitude.

Description:
This jumper exited a Cessna 182 below a 5,000-foot ceiling. His initial freefall and canopy flight were uneventful. The jumper, flying a Performance Designs Sabre2 135-square-foot canopy at a wing loading of 1.7:1, had 800 jumps in the past five years but only three in the last 30 days. Winds were a moderate 4-8 mph on the ground. The jumper turned onto the final leg of his landing pattern around 100 feet, and the canopy did not have time to recover from the turn before the jumper reached the ground. The jumper flared a little late and tried to slide in his landing, but his foot stuck in the soft ground. The report did not state whether this jumper suffered any injuries from his poor landing.

Conclusions:
This jumper made a low turn and his skills may have been rusty after a layoff from jumping. It is much safer to make conservative choices when you haven’t been jumping as frequently. This incident is an excellent example of why it is important to start the turn to final at 300 feet, even if wind conditions are mild. The jumper tried to flare before the canopy recovered from the turn and while it was surging downward, which reduced the power of the flare.

Description:
A student making their third jump had an uneventful freefall and canopy deployment and then piloted the canopy under radio instruction by a coach on the ground. The student was unable to make it back to the landing area and received instruction to land in a clear area. The coach, supervised by an instructor, instructed the student to flare at what appeared to the coach to be an appropriate altitude, although the student was actually 30-40 feet above the ground. The student then disappeared out of sight (the report did not indicate whether it was behind a tree line, terrain, building or other landscape feature), and the coach instructed the student to hold the flare until reaching the ground. The student had a hard landing and suffered multiple breaks to both ankles.

Conclusions:
This student made two previous jumps with safe landings. This situation may have had a better outcome if the coach, rather than guessing at an appropriate flare altitude, let the student determine it.

Description:
A Category H student, who had shown proficiency in canopy control and had not been guided by radio for eight to 10 jumps, flew a preplanned landing pattern to the center of the main landing area. He began the flare a couple of feet late but sped up the rate of the flare stroke to compensate. He lifted his legs to give the canopy more time to arrest the descent rate, which it did, achieving horizontal flight across the ground. The jumper elected to sit down and slide in the landing, but his right foot caught on the grass and folded under, breaking the ankle.

Conclusions:
Tandem instructors are experienced at performing slide-in landings with their students, but solo students should not attempt to land in this manner. A student who is unable to stand up a landing should always perform a PLF.

Description:
An instructor-assisted deployment student made a standard exit from the aircraft at the correct spot and performed a canopy controllability check. The weather conditions were appropriate for a student jump, with winds at about 5-10 knots and occasional light gusts. The student started the landing pattern with what the instructor felt were appropriate downwind and crosswind legs and turn to final approach. An instructor on the ground was in radio contact with the student, but the report did not state his location in relation to the student or what kind of view he had of the landing pattern. It did state that from the instructor’s vantage point, it initially appeared that the student was clear of all obstacles. However, the instructor realized shortly thereafter that the student might be over the hangar and told the student by radio, “If you are over the building, move to the side.” The instructor then told the student, “Standby,” likely in an attempt to tell the student not to flare yet. Immediately afterward, the student hit the hangar rooftop with no flare and fell an unreported distance to the pavement. The instructor immediately called 911, and the emergency medical technicians who responded took the student to a medical facility for examination. The report did not state what injuries the student sustained.

Conclusions:
Although the staff tasked with guiding students in by radio should make every effort to do so effectively, students are ultimately responsible for their landings and should understand this. Radio assistance is precisely that: assistance. Students must learn proper landing procedures and understand how to avoid obstacles independent of radio control. Instructors must run students through various landing scenarios during emergency-procedure reviews to build the students’ confidence in their decision-making skills and abilities under canopy. This student should have gone into half brakes as soon as he realized he was going to land on the building. This may have given him time to perform a flat turn to avoid landing on the building altogether and perform the rest of the flare as he reached the ground. Going into half brakes would also have changed the canopy’s glide path, which could possibly have allowed him to fly over the building to land in the open area on its other side. At the very least, it would have slowed his descent rate and given him more time to decide on an appropriate action.

Description:
During an AFF Category A skydive, a student flared much too high while landing. The staff member who was guiding the student in on radio told the student to hold the flare until reaching the ground. The student, whose legs were moving around prior to landing, held the flare but did not perform a PLF and broke an ankle. The student had surgery to repair the ankle later that week.

Conclusions:
This student would likely have walked away from this landing uninjured if they had repeatedly practiced PLFs and had a higher level of proficiency in performing them.